Post-immigration ‘difference’ and integration

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Introduction

In the twentieth century the United States was thought of as a place of racial and ethnic diversity but Europe thought of itself as a continent of white nation-states. Twenty-first century Europe, however, is going to be more like the USA – with the difference that the principal minority will be Muslims and the principal fault line may not be black/white but secular-Christian/Muslim. What form should integration take in this socio-political landscape? What implications are there for a continent that thinks it is secular but where state support for religion is routine; and for Christianity as a cultural marker of Europe? I suggest some possible scenarios after having identified ‘group difference’ as the

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1 Este artigo é apresentado tal como originalmente escrito. This article is presented as it was originally written. Este artículo se presenta tal como fue escrita originalmente.Questo articolo è presentato nella stessa form in cui è stato scritto. Cet article est présenté comme il a été écrit. Dieser Artikel wird präsentiert, wie sie ursprünglich geschrieben wurde.

2 I would like to thank my colleagues in the British Academy ‘New Paradigms in Public Policy’ project, especially its chair, Peter Taylor-Gooby, and two anonymous referees for their comments on earlier drafts; and also to Bhikhu Parekh, Albert Weale, Geoff Levey, Nasar Meer, Varun Uberoi and Aleksandra Lewicki for the same. [ALEKS: will you mentioned as a translator somewhere else or is this the place to do that too?]
key concept by which to understand the normative orientations, and their implicit sociologies, of assimilation, individualist-integration, cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism.

Identifying and responding to ‘difference’

The need for integration arises when an established society is faced by some people who are perceived and treated unfavourably from standard members (and typically who also perceive themselves as ‘different’ though not necessarily in a negative way). This may relate to different areas or sectors of society and policy, such as employment, education, housing and so on. Someone is integrated into, for example, the labour market when s/he is able to enjoy equality of opportunity in accessing jobs and careers, including accessing the education and training necessary to compete for such jobs and where the labour market is not segmented into different parts with radically different monetary rewards and working conditions for those with broadly similar qualifications and experience. This is particularly relevant, where the segmentation is not, formally or informally, based on criteria such as race, ethnicity, religion and so on, namely the categories of ‘difference’.

A core of integration is equality of opportunity in an unsegmented society and where no channeling into or away from a sector of society takes place based on criteria such as race and ethnicity. Integration has a number of components based on opportunities to participate which are context-specific and need to be secured by law and policy initiatives. It, however, also has a subjective and symbolic dimension, which again will have some context specific features, but which also has a more general or macro character: how a minority is perceived by the rest of the
country and how members of a minority perceive their relationship to society as a whole. Sectoral integration, however, even when achieved in a number of sectors, is not full integration without some degree of subjective identification with the society or country as a whole – what the Commission on Multi-Ethnic Britain called ‘a sense of belonging’ (CMEB, 2000: Introduction) and with the acceptance by the majority that you are a full member of society and have the right to feel that you belong.

Sectoral integration and the general sense of integration can happen at an individual level, an individual may choose to integrate or not, may be given opportunities to participate or not. My interest here is not on individual choices and opportunities themselves but when viewed at the level of groups or society as a whole. A sense of belonging is dependent on how others perceive and treat you, not just as an individual but also as a member of a racial group or ethno-religious community. Each policy area will have its own imperatives and difficulties (eg., whether it is issues of qualification levels or residential segregation) but there is also a general understanding that we as members of society have about what our society is and what it is to be a member – a macro-symbolic conception of society and of integration. This informs popular understanding as well as political ideas and the general terms of policy paradigms. Hence, it has been said by a Commission on these topics in Quebec, ‘the symbolic framework of integration (identity, religion, perception of the Other, collective memory, and so on) is no less important than its functional or material framework’ (Bouchard and Taylor, 2008). This is particularly so because the sense of ‘crisis’ about multiculturalism and integration is operating at this macro-symbolic level. This is evident when

3 Different groups may integrate to different degrees across sectors. For example, Jews in Britain are highly integrated in relation to employment but are the most segregated religious minority (Peach 2006).
one considers how few are the policies that could be said to be about integration or small the funds involved compared to the headline importance that the issues regularly achieve. In thinking about policy paradigms, of a general ethos or orientation at a national level it is therefore important to engage at this macro-symbolic level.4

I consider this larger, macro-symbolic sense of integration and implied policy paradigms in terms of four modes of integration summarised in Table 1, namely, assimilation, individualist-integration and two versions of multiculturalism, one of which I will call cosmopolitanism.5 Each offers their own distinctive take on freedom, equality and civic unity (what might be called ‘fraternity’ or solidarity), the core values of European democracy. Different interpretations and prioritisations of these concepts suggest embryonic paradigms. The issue or ‘problem’ these paradigms are addressing is post-immigration ‘difference’ (Modood 2007). Large-scale immigration into Europe from outside Europe has been by people marked by ‘difference’. The ‘difference’ is not confined to the fact of migration, or how long the migrants and their families have been in Europe, or the fact that they come from less economically developed parts of the world i.e. aspects which can be stated structurally and quantitatively. ‘Difference’ primarily refers to how people are identified: how they identify themselves (for example as ‘white’,

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4 For an alternative view that at a moment when general conceptions are confused, we can best grasp what the real issues are by focusing on ‘the everyday’, see Fox and Miller-Idris (2008).

5 The concern here is not primarily in relation to socio-economic integration, for which see Loury, Modood and Teles (2005) and Heath and Cheung (2007). The bigger challenge, for another occasion, is to connect the socio-economic with the issues discussed in this paper. The issues of ‘difference’, however, are as important as the socio-economic in relation to equal citizenship and have to be understood in their own terms.
‘black’, ‘Chinese’, ‘Muslim’ etc.), how they identify others (again as ‘white’, ‘black’, ‘Chinese’, ‘Muslim’ etc.) and how they are identified by others (‘white’ etc.).

These identities fall (not necessarily unambiguously or discretely) within the fields of ‘race’, ethnicity, religion, culture and nationality as various forms of difference. They will no doubt be classed or gendered in specific or generalisable ways but the important point from which everything else follows is that these identities are not reducible to, or, stronger still, are not primarily socio-economic or ‘objective’ in classical sociological terms; the identities involve subjectivity and agency. The migrants and the ‘hosts’, or more accurately, given that the migrations in question took place mainly in the third quarter of the twentieth century, minority-majority relations, cannot be understood without the forms of difference. The relevant interactions cannot be explained, the position of different actors cannot be predicted (or even guessed at), and political preferences cannot be expressed without the explicit or implicit use of the forms of difference. The concepts I analyse below are normative and policy-oriented but they presuppose a sociology, an understanding of what the social phenomenon is, that needs a political response. The problem then, is how to integrate difference, by which I mean the process whereby difference ceases to be problematic. I shall consider four modes of integration (summarised in Table 1).

**Modes of Integration**

*Assimilation* is where the processes affecting change and the relationship between social groups are seen as one-way, the preferred result is one where the newcomers do little to disturb the society they are settling in and become as much like their
new compatriots as possible.\textsuperscript{6} We may think of it as one-way integration. This may simply be a laissez-faire approach but the state can play an active role in bringing about the desired outcome, as in early twentieth century ‘Americanisation’ policies towards European migrants in the United States. The desired outcome for society as a whole is seen as involving least change in the ways of doing things for the majority of the country and its institutional policies. By erasing difference it is also thought that the occasions for discrimination and conflict are not allowed to take root. From the 1960s onwards, beginning with anglophone countries and spreading to others, assimilation as a policy has come to be seen as impractical (especially for those who stand out in terms of physical appearance), illiberal (requiring too much state intervention) and inegalitarian (treating indigenous citizens as a norm to which others must approximate). It was as early as 1966 that Roy Jenkins, the UK home secretary, declared that in the view of the British government integration is ‘not a flattening process of assimilation but equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’ (Jenkins 1967: 267). While ‘assimilation’ as a term has come to be dropped in favour of ‘integration’, even today, when some politicians use the term ‘integration’, they actually, consciously or not, mean what here has been defined as assimilation, so the use of these terms in public discourse must not be taken at their face value but critically inspected.

In the three non-assimilative modes of integration processes of social interaction are seen as two-way, where members of the majority community as well as immigrants and ethnic minorities

\textsuperscript{6} When US sociologists use the term ‘assimilation’, they usually mean what is meant by integration in the UK, as in the ‘segmented assimilation’ proposed by Portes and Zhou (1993).
are required to do something; so the latter cannot alone be blamed for failing to, or not trying to, integrate. The established society is the site of institutions – including employers, civil society and the state – in which integration has to take place, and accordingly they must take the lead. The new (prospective) citizens’ rights and opportunities must be made effective through anti-discrimination laws and policies. We need, however, to distinguish between individualist-integration and multiculturalism. The former sees the institutional adjustments in relation to migrants or minorities as only individual claimants and bearers of rights as equal citizens (Barry 2001). Minority communities may exist as private associations but are not recognised or supported in the public sphere.

Multiculturalism is where processes of integration are seen both as two-way and as involving groups as well as individuals and as working differently for different groups (CMEB 2000; Parekh 2000; Modood 2007). In this understanding, each group is distinctive, and thus integration cannot consist of a single template (hence the ‘multi’). The ‘culturalism’ – by no means a happy term either in relation to ‘culture’ or ‘ism’ – refers to that the groups in question are likely not just to be marked by newness or phenotype or socio-economic location but by certain forms of group identities. The integration of groups is in addition to, not as an alternative to, the integration of individuals, anti-discrimination measures and a robust framework of individual rights. Multiculturalism, like most concepts, takes different form in different contexts and at different times. For example, it has been differently understood in the Netherlands than in Britain (Joppke 2004, Koopmans et al, 2005) and in Quebec compared to in Anglophone Canada (Bouchard and Taylor, 2008): chapter 6). The meaning of any mode of integration is subject to debate and contestation and its policy originators may start with one meaning, as for example, Roy Jenkins did in relation to race and culture and others, including late comers to the debate,
may push it or extend it in other directions by say, making religion central, as Muslims in Britain have done (Modood, 2005).

Amongst what is central to multiculturalism is the concept of equality, as indeed it is to other conceptions of integration. The key difference between individualist-integration and multiculturalism is that the concepts of group and of ‘multi’ are essential to the latter. Post-immigration minorities are groups differentiated from the majority society or the norm in society by two kinds of processes. On the one hand, by the fact of negative ‘difference’ with alienness, inferiorisation, stigmatisation, stereotyping, exclusion, discrimination, racism and so on. On the other hand, by the senses of identity that groups so perceived have of themselves. The two together are the key data for multiculturalism. The differences at issue are those perceived both by outsiders or group members – from the outside in and from the inside out – to constitute not just some form of distinctness but a form of alienness or inferiority that diminishes or makes difficult equal membership in the wider society or polity.

Multiculturalism has recently been defined as ‘where ethno-cultural-religious minorities are, or are thought of, as rather distinct communities, and where public policy encourages this distinctiveness’ (Emmerson, 2011). This, however, is only a third of it. Multiculturalism allows those who wish to encourage such distinctiveness to do so; but it also seeks forms of social unity that are compatible with this, what Hartmann and Gerteis (2005) call ‘new conceptions of solidarity’, grounded in a concept of equality (Bouchard and Taylor, 2008). Each mode of integration must be understood in terms of its interpretation of free choice, equality and fraternity. Characterisations of multiculturalism that subtract its emphasis on unity are extremely common but incomplete.
Further unpacking multiculturalism and integration

Multicultural accommodation of minorities, then, is different from individualist-integration because it explicitly recognises the social reality of groups, not just of individuals and organisations. There may, however, be considerable complexity about what is meant by social reality of groups or ‘groupness’ here, and ideas of groups as discrete, homogeneous, unchanging, bounded populations are not realistic when we are thinking of multicultural recognition (Modood 2007: 93-7). This leads us to cosmopolitanism.

Cosmopolitanism emerges by accepting the concept of difference while critiquing or dissolving the concept of groups (Waldron 1991). Disagreement about the extent to which post-immigration groups exist and/or ought to exist and be given political status means that there are two kinds of multiculturalism (Modood 1998; Meer and Modood 2009a). While in public discourse as well as in academia one or both are referred to as multiculturalism, and often without a full recognition that

7 Cf., ‘The ethnic group in American society became not a survival from the age of mass immigration but a new social form’ (Glazer and Moynihan 1963: xvii).
8 Here I do not mean the idea of that there should be a world government or primarily even the ethical view that one should be a citizen of the world, rather I am characterising a mode of integration within a country that emphasises a mixing of people from all over the world as in the expression ‘London is a cosmopolitan city’. British sociologists sometimes use the term ‘multiculture’ but this clearly has not carried over into public discourse. It has been suggested to me that the term ‘interculturalism’ best fits here but the place where it is most used in relation to national politics, Quebec, it is closer to what here I call ‘individualist-integration’. More generally, it is not clear that ‘interculturalism’ includes anything that is not or cannot be included in multiculturalism (see Meer and Modood, forthcoming 2012). I did also consider the term ‘diversity’ but it is either too descriptive and generic, and does not pick out a mode of integration, or has been appropriated as ‘diversity management’ by human resource professionals.
two different ideas are being expressed, I will reserve the term ‘multiculturalism’ for the sociological and political position in which groups are a critical feature.\footnote{This is how the term has been used by the leading political theorists such as Taylor (1994), Kymlicka (1995) and Parekh (2000) and, by the Canadian government; it is also consistent with CMEB (2000) and other exponents of multiculturalism - see Modood (2007: 14-20) for details.}

Where ‘difference’ is positively valorised (or pragmatically accepted) but it is denied that groups exist or, alternatively, exist but should not be politically recognised, I shall call cosmopolitanism. The contention is that in the early stages of migration and settlement, especially in the context of a legacy of racism, colonialism and European supremacism, forms of social exclusion created or reinforced certain forms of groupness such as white and black. However, as a result of social mixing, cultural sharing and globalisation in which dominant identities of modernity (such as of race and nation) are dissolving, people have much more fluid and multiple identities, combine them in individual ways and use them in context-sensitive ways (Hall 1992a). For example, the ways that Caribbean-origin Britons have socially blended into a ‘multiculture’ and have sought conviviality and sociability rather than separate communities may perhaps not be fully captured as a form of individualistic integration (Gilroy 2000). While remaining economically marginal and over-represented in relation to the social problems associated with deprived inner city areas, they have become a feature of popular culture in terms of music, dance, youth styles and sport, in all of which they have become significantly over-represented (Hall 1998). To the extent that football teams, Olympiads and television programmes such as The X Factor are central to popular and national identities, Caribbean-origin people are placed at the centre of British national imaginaries. Moreover, Britain and most other countries in western Europe have recently
experienced and are experiencing a new wave of immigration and will continue to do so, including from within the European Union. Given the diversity of the locations from where migrants are coming, the result, it is argued, is not communities, but a churning mass of languages, ethnicities and religions, all cutting across each other and creating a ‘super-diversity’ (Vertovec 2007). This may be setting a pattern for the future, and it may be allied to a further argument that globalisation, migration and telecommunications have created populations dispersed across countries that interact more with each other, and have a greater sense of loyalty to each other, than they might to their fellow citizens.

Table 1: Four modes of integration*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objects of Policy</th>
<th>Assimilation</th>
<th>Individualist-Integration</th>
<th>Cosmopolitanism</th>
<th>Multiculturalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Individuals and groups marked by ‘difference’.</td>
<td>Individuals marked by ‘difference’, especially their treatment by discriminatory practices of state and civil society.</td>
<td>Individuals marked by ‘difference’, especially their treatment by discriminatory practices of state and civil society, and societal ideas, especially of ‘us’ and ‘them’.</td>
<td>Individuals and groups marked by ‘difference’, especially their treatment by discriminatory practices of state and civil society, and societal ideas, especially of ‘us’ and ‘them’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberty</td>
<td>Minorities must be encouraged to conform to the dominant cultural pattern.</td>
<td>Minorities are free to assimilate or cultivate their identities in private but are discouraged from thinking of themselves as minority, but rather as individuals.</td>
<td>Neither minority nor majority individuals should think of themselves as belonging to a single identity but be free to mix and match.</td>
<td>Members of minorities should be free to assimilate, to mix and match or to cultivate group membership in proportions of their own choice.</td>
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### Equality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assimilation</th>
<th>Individualist-Integration</th>
<th>Cosmopolitanism</th>
<th>Multiculturalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presence of difference provokes discrimination and so is to be avoided.</td>
<td>Discriminatory treatment must be actively eliminated so everyone is treated as an individual and not on the basis of difference.</td>
<td>Anti-discrimination must be accompanied by the dethroning of the dominant culture.</td>
<td>In addition to anti-discrimination the public sphere must accommodate the presence of new group identities and norms.</td>
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### Fraternity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assimilation</th>
<th>Individualist-Integration</th>
<th>Cosmopolitanism</th>
<th>Multiculturalism</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A strong, homogeneous national identity.</td>
<td>Absence of discrimination and nurturing of individual autonomy within a national, liberal democratic citizenship.</td>
<td>People should be free to unite across communal and national boundaries and should think of themselves as global citizens.</td>
<td>Citizenship and national identity must be remade to include group identities that are important to minorities as well as majorities; the relationship between groups should be dialogical rather than one of domination or uniformity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*In all cases it is assumed that a backdrop of liberal democratic rights and values are operative to a large degree and what is highlighted here is in addition or interaction with them.*

In what ways does cosmopolitanism go beyond individualist-integration? Primarily not as a politics but as an ethos: we should value diversity and create the conditions where it is individually chosen. We should oppose all forms of imposition of group identities on individuals and therefore the ideas, images and prejudices by which individuals are inferiorised or portrayed as threatening and so excluded from full membership of society; and we should not require assimilation or conformity to dominant group norms. Yet a requirement of communal membership can also be oppressive of individuals and their life-chances (Appiah 1994). Inherited or ascribed identities which slot people into pigeonholes not of their choosing, giving them a script to live by, should be
refused (often referred to in the literature as a ‘transgression of boundaries’). They not only reduce the options of the kind of person one can be but divide society up into antagonistic groups.\textsuperscript{10} Cosmopolitanism is a conception of multiculturalism as maximum freedom, for minority as well as majority individuals, to mix with, borrow and learn from all (whether they are of your group or not) so individual identities are personal amalgams of bits from various groups and heritages and there is no one dominant social identity to which all must conform. The result will be a society composed of a blend of cultures, a ‘multiculture’.

While this is an attractive image of contemporary society and blends easily with the ideas of liberal democracy, it has only a partial fit with even, say, London today, let alone many parts of Britain and continental Europe. In some towns and cities, such as in northern England, there is not a diversity of groups but often just two (for example Asian Muslims and whites) and minority individuals do not float across identities, mixing and matching, but have a strong attachment to a one or few identities. For example, most British Muslims seem to think of themselves in terms of ‘Muslim’ and/or ‘British’ (usually both) (Travis 2002). The fact of super-diversity is emerging alongside rather than displacing the fact of settled, especially postcolonial, communities, who have a particular historical relationship with Britain, and the political significance of such communities. Similarly, there are other communities in other European countries with their own historical significance such as Maghrebians in France and the Turks in Germany. Moreover, some groups continue to be much larger than others, and stand out as groups – in their own eyes and

\textsuperscript{10}British exponents of this view tend, however, to put some communal identities in a normative, privileged position. This particularly applies to political blackness and to some extent to non-cultural and non-religious political identities generally (Modood 1994).
those of others – and are at the centre of public policy and debate, especially if they are thought to be failing to integrate. Muslims, for example, seem to be in this category across much of western Europe regardless of the degree of conviviality or super-diversity that might be present.

That is not to say that such minority identities are exclusive. Successive surveys have shown that most Muslims in Britain strongly identify with being Muslim but the majority also identify as British; indeed they are more likely to identify with ‘British’ and say they have trust in key British institutions than non-Muslims (Heath and Roberts 2008); Gallup (2009) found the same in Germany, albeit less so in France though Pew (2006) found much higher levels of national identification in France than other western European countries. Post-immigration hyphenated identities, such as British-Indian, have become as commonplace in Britain as they have been in the USA for decades. Similarly, diasporic links as described above certainly exist, and are likely to increase, but the net result is not an inevitable erosion of national citizenship – British African-Caribbeans and South Asians have families in their countries of origin and in the US and Canada, but there is little evidence that most branches of those families do not feel British, American or Canadian.

An important point of difference, then, between the concepts of individualist-integration and multiculturalism proper is that for the latter, the groups in question, the post-immigration minorities, are not of one kind but are a ‘multi’. For example, some people will identify with a colour identity like ‘black’ but there will be others for whom national origin identities (like ‘Turkish’), or a regional heritage (like ‘Berber’), or a religious identity (like ‘Sikh’) may be much more meaningful, expressing forms of community and ethnic pride that are struggling for recognition and inclusion. And of course these minority identities will interact with wider, societal
identities – ‘woman’, ‘working class’, ‘Londoner’, ‘British’ – in differing ways, expressing the different experiences, locations and aspirations of different groups. So, both the alternative models of multiculturalism as cosmopolitanism and as, what may be called, ethno-religious communitarianism, for which I am reserving the term, multiculturalism, have some grounding and meet the political aspirations of some minority groups. Neither works as a comprehensive sociological or political model and they should be viewed as complementary (Modood 1998; CMEB 2000; Modood and Dobbernack 2011). Moreover, while recognition of ethnic or religious groups may have a legal dimension, for the most part, it will be at the level of civic consultations, political participation, institutional policies (for example, schools and hospitals), discursive representations, especially in relation to the changing discourses of societal unity or national identity, and their remaking.

Regardless of the extent to which recognition of minority identities in this way is formal or informal, led by the state or the semi-autonomous institutions of civil society, it does not challenge, let alone displace, individual rights and the shared dimensions of citizenship. There may however be genuine concern that some groups at a particular time and in some areas are becoming too inward-looking. Where the concern is primarily about a lack of positive mixing and interaction between groups at a local level, community cohesion measures – for example, a Christian school offering places to non-Christians or twinning with a non-Christian school - may be an appropriate response (Cantle 2001). Where the concern is about self-conceptions and discourses more generally, the issue will be about the national or societal identity. Whilst such inwardness has never been part of any theory or policy of multiculturalism, it is clear that it is a fundamental anxiety of the critics of multiculturalism, many of whom go as far as
to define multiculturalism in terms of such separatism. It is therefore important to emphasise that multiculturalism is a mode of integration, and that it, no less than hostility to minorities or other modes of integration, should be examined as possible contributory causes of exclusion and segregation (Banting and Kymlicka 2008).

Ways in which multiculturalism is not dead

This unpacking of what I mean by ‘multiculturalism’ is also helpful in understanding those who say that multiculturalism has failed (Weldon 1989; and see Presseurop 2010 for Angela Merkel’s speech on the failure of multikulti) or that multiculturalism is dead (Cameron 2011). They may mean to endorse assimilation, individualistic integration or cosmopolitanism. At the same time they are acknowledging and possibly reinforcing the sociological reality of group difference because their lament is that some groups (especially Muslims) are clearly visible as distinct groups when they should not be; they attribute this fact to a separatist tendency in the groups, encouraged by allegedly multiculturalist policies. Hence paradoxical as it may sound, fierce critics of multiculturalism are usually deploying the sociology of multiculturalism even while rejecting its political dimensions. If they thought these

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11 A review of the American social science literature found that ‘[t]he most common conception of multiculturalism in both scholarly circles and popular discourse is a negative one, having to do with what multiculturalism is not or what it stands in opposition to. Multiculturalism, in this usage, represents heterogeneity as opposed to homogeneity, diversity as a counterpoint to unity’ (Hartmann and Gerteis, 2005: 219). They found that if they looked at exponents, as opposed to critics, of multiculturalism, such simplistic dichotomies were unsustainable and they concluded: ‘multiculturalism is best understood as a critical-theoretical project, an exercise in cultivating new conceptions of solidarity in the context of dealing with the realities of pervasive and increasing diversity in contemporary societies’ (221-222).
groups were merely the product of stereotypes and exclusion (in the sense that ‘racial’ groups are a product of racism) or were primarily socio-economic in character (perhaps a working class ‘fraction’), then that would be a sociological disagreement with the multiculturalists. The irony is, of course, that the accusatory discourse of ‘some groups are not integrating’ may actually be reinforcing group identities and therefore contributing to the social conditions that gives multiculturalism a sociological pertinence. On the other hand, a sociology that marginalised ethnicity in favour of say, individuals, class and gender, would have a better fit with anti-multiculturalist politics but may be unable to explain or predict the relevant social reality. Our normative orientation – individualist or multiculturalist – suggests to us an ideal sociology but also recommends itself to us as feasible politics because we think that sociology is more accurate than not.12

Moreover, it is not just at the level of sociology that anti-multiculturalists may find themselves using multiculturalist ideas; even while deploying an anti-multiculturalist discourse they may enact multiculturalist policies. For example, they may continue

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12 Equality is of course a normative concept and not merely a statistical or analytical concept. It is one of the organising concepts of social science, not just in relation to minority-majority relations but also to, for example, the social science of class or gender. Social science does not need a resolution of the normative debates in order to proceed and much research and analysis can be conducted by bracketing off normative questions, but without concepts such as equality social scientists would not know what to look for in say answering the questions ‘what are the causes of inequality?’ or ‘is Britain becoming more or less equal?’. Normative questions can be avoided in relation to a specific research project but nevertheless are constitutive of fields of inquiry, not to mention significance. Just as computer software can be designed to process data according to certain analytical parameters, so similarly, a ‘positivist’ research project can be conducted without asking normative questions. Yet just as the software can only be designed by someone who has an analytical model in mind, so similarly the analytical model itself presupposes a background normative concept without which it could not get started.
with group consultations, representation and accommodation. The latter have actually increased. The British government has found it necessary to increase the scale and level of consultations with Muslims in Britain since 9/11, and, dissatisfied with existing organisations, has sought to increase the number of organised interlocutors and the channels of communication. Avowedly anti-multiculturalist countries and governments have worked to increase corporatism in practice, for example with the creation by Nicholas Sarkozy of the Conseil Francais du Culte Musulman in 2003 to represent all Muslims to the French government in matters of worship and ritual; and by the creation of the Islamkonferenz in Germany in 2005, an exploratory body, yet with an extensive political agenda. These bodies are partly top-down efforts to control Muslims or to channel them into certain formations and away from others; nevertheless, such institutional processes cannot be understood within the conceptual framework of assimilation, individualist integration or cosmopolitanism.

There is indeed a new intolerance in relation to certain Muslim practices (for example, the burqa) and this is leading to some new laws or policies in parts of Europe (though not yet in Britain). The point is that we do not seem to be witnessing a paradigm shift, for example, from pluralistic integration to individualist integration. The anti-multiculturalist may not just be pointing to the visibility of groups like Muslims but expressing the view that there is an insufficient participation of such groups into a common life or sharing of common values. My point is that some of the measures resorted to are not consistent with assimilation or individualism but acknowledge the social reality and political significance of groups. It may be thought that I am here obscuring the central difference between multiculturalism and its political critics. Namely, that the latter but not the former emphasise integration into a common life. I am, however, disputing this: the multiculturalism
in the writings of key theorists such as, Taylor, Kymlicka, Parekh and Phillips, and in the relevant documents, laws and policies of Canada, Australia and Britain are all aimed at integration (see Modood, 2007: 14-20 for details). The difference between the pro- and anti-multiculturalists lies not in the goal of integration but, firstly, in the normative understanding of integration. I have tried to bring this out by reference to the alternative interpretations and prioritizing of the normative concepts of liberty, equality and fraternity (summarized in Table 1). Secondly, there are different judgements about contexts and about what will deliver results and more generally how society works or what I have been calling implicit sociologies.

The analytical framework offered helps us also to understand those who say they welcome diversity but seem to be in agreement with critics of multiculturalism. Critics of multiculturalism are usually pointing to the public assertion of strong group identities to mobilise a group to achieve certain policies and/or to demand differential treatment. They are sometimes responded to by those who point to how multiculturalism is working in their neighbourhoods, which they say are multi-ethnic and where people do not just live peaceably side by side but mix freely and where that mixing is valued above monoculturalism. Yet such views do not imply support for strong group identities and related policies; on the contrary, their success may be seen to be dependent on the absence of the latter.13 While this is a reasonable response in its own terms it does not meet the criticism of multiculturalism and in fact may share it. Group-based multiculturalism has become unpopular and is what critics have in mind, though this is obscured

13Hence the irony that anti-multiculturalists like President Sarkozy are trying to create corporate representations for Muslims in France; while pro-diversity authors call for the cessation of government meetings with Muslim community leaders (Sen 2006; Malik 2011).
by the fact that what I call ‘cosmopolitanism’ is often referred to by its advocates as ‘multiculturalism’.

For example, it has been argued that the majority of Australians welcome multiculturalism, indeed they see it as part of the country’s identity but they see it ‘in terms of a mix of individuals rather than an ensemble of groups’ (Brett and Moran 2011: 203). A group-based multiculturalism is much less popular than cosmopolitanism, but what we have to consider is: can integration of all post-immigration formations be achieved without the latter (Modood 1998; 2007)? Moreover, a group-based multiculturalism, where group membership is voluntary, may be part of the future in an unintended way as it is highly compatible with the Prime Minister Cameron’s vision of a ‘Big Society’ in which civil society associations based on locality and faith, including inter-faith groups, take over some responsibilities currently undertaken by state agencies. If it is the case that groups such as Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims are to be civil society partners of government, and to be delegated resources as such, it is difficult to see how the new Big Society is a break with what is rejected as ‘state multiculturalism’ (Cameron 2011).

The analysis offered here of related macro-symbolic ideas and policy paradigms, each of which consists of a model of society and normative political ideas, includes a sense of unity or fraternity. For modes of integration are not just about sociology (the first level) or politics (second level), but include ideas, however inchoate, of ourselves as a social unity (as displayed at the bottom of Table 1). For assimilationists, this consists of a strong, homogeneous national identity. Individualist-integration emphasizes the liberal and democratic character of the national polity. Cosmopolitanism is uneasy with the national, an identity that demands allegiance from all citizens, whilst creating boundaries between ourselves and the rest of the world. With
multiculturalism comes a positive vision of the whole remade so as to include the previously excluded or marginalised on the basis of equality and sense of belonging. It is at this level that we may fully speak of multicultural integration or multicultural citizenship (Taylor 1994; Parekh 2000; Modood 2007). This third level of multiculturalism, incorporating the sociological fact of diversity, groupness and exclusion, but going beyond individual rights and political accommodation, is perhaps the level that has been least emphasised. Or at least that is how it seems to many whose understanding of multiculturalism, sometimes polemical but sometimes sincere, is that multiculturalism is about encouraging minority difference without a counterbalancing emphasis on cross-cutting commonalities and a vision of a greater good. This has led many commentators and politicians to talk of multiculturalism as divisive and productive of segregation.

Theorists of multiculturalism such as Taylor (1994) and Parekh (2000), related policy documents such as the report of the CMEB (2000), and enactments such as those in Canada and Australia, universally regarded as pioneers and exemplars of state multiculturalism, all appealed to and built on an idea of national citizenship. Hence, from a multiculturalist point of view, though not from that of its critics, the recent emphasis on cohesion and citizenship, what has been called ‘the civic turn’ (Mouritsen 2008), is a necessary rebalancing of the political multiculturalism of the 1990s, which largely took the form of accommodation of groups while being ambivalent about national identity (Meer and Modood 2009a).14 This does not invalidate the analysis offered here that integration without some degree of institutional accommodation is

14In the 1990s cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism in Britain began to be linked to a national identity and its modernisation, to, for example, ‘Cool Britannia’ and ‘rebranding Britain’ (Leonard 1997) but others welcomed globalisation as an era of the ‘post-national’ (Hall, 1992b and Soysal 1994).
unlikely to be successful. Indeed, for multiculturalists a renewing of national identity has to be distinctly plural and hospitable to the minority identities. It involves ‘rethinking the national story’ with the minorities as important characters; not obscuring difference but weaving it into a common identity that all can see themselves in and giving all a sense of belonging to each other (CMEB 2000: 54-6; Modood 2007: 145-154). Minority politics are common in the US but most groups, while honouring their origins, seek inclusion in the American dream. They seek to be and have come to be accepted as hyphenated Americans (Italian-Americans, Asian-Americans etc.) and the trend is present in parts of western Europe and, while not yet fully accepted, it may be that hyphenated nationalities will become the norm here too.

Conclusion

It may be the case that all the attempted models of integration, especially national models, are in crisis, certainly they are perceived as such. We can, however, have a better sense of what the issues are and so what needs to be done if, firstly, we recognize that discourses of integration and multiculturalism are exercises in conceptualising post-immigration difference and as such operate at three distinct levels: as an (implicit) sociology; as a political response; and as a vision of what is the whole in which difference is to be integrated. Depending upon the sociology in question, certain political responses are possible or not, or, more reasonable or less. The sociological and political assumptions are thus mutually dependent. Secondly, I have offered a framework in which four distinct political responses – assimilation, individualist-integration, cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism – illuminate each other and where each successive position attempts to include what is thought to be missing from the predecessor. Each position, however, has
its merits and may be appropriate in certain contexts, depending on the sociological reading of the context. Each has a particular conception of equal citizenship but the value of each can only be realised if it is not imposed but is the preferred choice of minority individuals and groups, who of course — being a ‘multi’ — are bound to choose differently. Thus no singular model is likely to be suitable for all groups. To have a reasonable chance of integrating the maximum number of members of minorities, none of these political responses should be dismissed. Ethno-religious communitarianism may currently be viewed as undesirable by European publics and policymakers but given how central Muslims have become to the prospects of integration on a number of fronts, it is unlikely that integration can be achieved without some element of this approach, which is being practised even by those politicians who are making anti-multiculturalist speeches. Perceptions of Muslims as groups, by themselves and by non-Muslim majorities, are hardening; so the key question is whether they are to be stigmatised as outsiders or recognised as integral to the polity. Finally, we must not overlook the third analytical level, which in many ways is not primarily about minorities but about the majority. The enlargement, hyphenation and internal pluralising of national identities is essential to an integration in which all citizens have not just rights but a sense of belonging to the whole as well as to their own ‘little platoon’ (Burke 1986: 135).

REFERENCES


15‘To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in... we proceed towards a love to our country, and to mankind’ (Burke 1986: 135).


